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Bank institutions in Indonesia have three form of ownership structure. There are private, 
government and community development banks. One of the unique banking in Indonesia is 
that there are community development bank (CDB), which is a government-owned bank 
districts. This research investigates the effect ownership structure on the nonperforming loans 
of Indonesia banks.The data used in this research is secondary data with reference to all the 
Bank in Indonesia for the period 2008-2013. Total population of the study was 124 banks 
from 2008 up to the period of 2013. Sampling was done by purposive sampling method which 
gained 45 national private banks, 22 CDB and 4 government banks. The results showed that 
there are different variables NPL, CAR, LDR and ROA of individual ownership of national 
private banks, CDB and government bank. ROA and LDR have a significant effect on the 
NPL. One thing that is very interesting in this study is the ownership dummy CDB positive 
effect on the NPLs, it indicates that the CDB had a large level of non-performing loans 
compared to private and government banks. 
 
Key words : Non Performing Loan, community development banks and Private 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
Companies owned by the government may not be managed efficiently because the board of 
directors and the management does not hold any shares in the company. This led to the company's 
performance will be affected (Megginson, et al, 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001). Agency problems 
in the context of government ownership is more complicated because the government holds shares in 
the company on behalf of the people or the people. Because the government led by politicians who do 
not have any ownership in these companies, then they probably will not be watching the actions of the 
board of directors or management. In addition, the objectives of the politicians who led a government 
may differ from an individual who has a business.  
Shleifer (1998) and La Porta et al. (2002) stated that the government is likely to meet the 
political goals that might affect the company's financial performance negatively. This view is 
supported by Paskelian (2006) and Xu and Wang (1999) which states that the company is not efficient 
because of agency problems arising from the government's political motives. In addition, the state-
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owned bank may have a lower profit due to finance a project that does not bring financial benefits but 
brings social benefits. 
Government ownership seems to explain the behavior of risk taking of bankers and 
consequently the level of NPLs. Salas and Saurina (2002) argue that to enhance the economic 
development of the country, government-owned banks have more incentives to fund riskier projects 
and to allocate more favorable credits for small and medium frms. This inadequate risk taking 
behavior (compared to the return profile) will lead to a higher level of NPLs. Micco et al. (2004) 
report that state-owned banks tend to have higher levels of NPLs, due to their weak credit recovery 
capacity compared to privately owned banks. Others suggest that the interaction between private and 
government shareholding in the same bank could determine the risk level taken by banks. 
 
Hu et al. (2004) argue that unjustified risky behavior is lower when the two groups check and 
balance each other. In the opposite, when private and government shareholders collude (especially in 
societies with little civil disciplines), problem loans will be higher due to risky credit offering. Tian 
(2000) suggests that under conditions of market imperfection, due to a balancing mechanism between 
management incentives and bureaucracy forces, a mixed enterprise (joint shareholding of private and 
government owners) will maximize social surplus. Novaes and Werlang (1995) report lower 
performance for government controlled banks in Brazil and Argentina due to high proportion of 
problem loans given to government.  
 
Micco et al. (2004), examining 50000 financial institutions with different ownership types 
covering 119 countries, conclude that NPLs tend to be higher for banks with government ownership 
than for other groups. This is explained by the development mandate given to government-owned 
banks in developing economies. Hu et al. (2004) examining a panel of Taiwanese banks find a positive 
correlation between capital share owned by the government and the level of NPLs. Garciýa-Marco and 
Robles-Fernàndez (2007) examine the relationship between risk taking and ownership structure. They 
find that commercial banks (mainly private owned) are more exposed to risk than deposit banks 
(mainly government owned). 
 
Further, by having a lot of literature on the determinants of NPLs of banks across worldwide, 
it is important to examine in Ethiopia case. This is due to the fact that, it is difficult to make 
generalization about the NPLs for the developing economy based on the result of developed economy 
without making any research. Besides, since the majority of bank assets are hold by loans, unless the 
determinants of NPLs are visualized to enhance the quality of asset, it is hard for the survival the 
banking sectors. 
 
The adverse effect of NPLs is attributable to bank managers’ adverse selection of its 
borrowers (Brownbridge, 1998). NPLs are determined by different factors such as level of growth 
economic, inflation, ownership structure, loan to deposit ratio,  volume of deposit, return on equity, 
return on asset, capital adequacy, total loan, liquidity, bank size, excessive lending, interest rate and 
credit growth. These factors are studied by different researchers in different countries (Boudriga et al., 
2009; Ahmad, 2013; Tehulu and Olana, 2014 and etc.). 
 
Generally, the basic motive for this study is that, different studies were done in Western 
Europe and East African countries (Saba et al. (2012), Louzis et al. (2010), Badar and Yasmin (2013) 
and Moti et al. (2012). However, the results of those studies were inconsistent. This inconsistency of 
results might be attributable to the method of data analysis used by different researchers and difference 
in the economic condition of the countries in which banking sectors are operating. Though, there are a 
number of studies that are conducted at a global level to examine the determinants of NPLs, most of 
the studies were made with reference to developed countries like India, China, Japan, Turkey, United 
of Kindom, Spain, Greece, German, Malaysia and USA. but the uniqueness of Indonesian banking 
system is that there is another government owned banks category, which is called the community 




Community development banks in Indonesia exist in every district. They are monetary 
organizations operated on a local basis. In terms of coverage, their coverage is much smaller than the 
private and the publicly owned banks. RDB categorized as focused bank, ie the bank with regional 
focus. RDB thus able to create a healthy banking structure in the country and able to meet the needs of 
the community and to promote the ongoing economic development of Indonesia. What can be the 
ownership structure to non-performing loans in Indonesia?. These are the questions that the study 
wishes to answer. 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
NPLs is likely to hamper economic growth and reduce the economic efficiency. The shocks to 
the financial system can arise from factors specific to the bank or macroeconomic conditions. In 
general, the researches adopted in the developed economies have confirmed that macroeconomic 
conditions affect credit risk. Relative causes of NPLs occurrence cited by some researchers includes; 
economic condition (Brownbridge, 1998; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Das and Ghosh, 2007; Al-Smadi 
and Ahmad, 2009), interest rate (Fofack, 2005; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Al-Smadi and Ahmad, 
2009), inflation (Rajan and Dhal, 2003; Al-Smadi and Ahmad, 2009; Pasha and Khemraj, 2009, 
Farhan et al.(2012), Skarica(2013), Klein(2013), Tomak(2013)), credit growth (Keeton, 2003; 
Boudriga et al., 2009), inefficiency (Peristiani, 1996; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbis, 
1997), profitability (Godlewski, 2004; Marco-Garciya and Robles-Fernàndez, 2008, Swamy(2012), 
Selma and Jouini(2013), Bougriga et al. (2009)), ownership (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Micco et al. 
(2004), Hu et al. (2004), Berger et al. (2005), Iannota et al. (2007), Boudriga et al. (2009), Ahmad 
(2013), Adjei-Mensah (2014) and Tehulu and Olana (2014);; Misra and Dhal, 2010).  
 
The existing literature has provided evidence relating the performance comparison between 
publicly and privately owned banks. Agency costs in the government owned firms can results in the 
weak managerial rewards, under-utilization and misallocation of resources. Agency cost view 
illustrates that private firm’s mangers do not work at their full potential as compared to private firm’s 
counterpart and usually use most of the resources for their personal benefits. From political corruption 
aspects state owned banks works to serve the supporters of government, political influence in banks 
decreases efficiency and loan quality by allocating the funds on political basis (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005).  
The existing studies have proved that poorer loan quality and high NPLs are mainly associated 
with government owned banks (Berger et al. 2005 and Iannota et al. 2007). Iannota et al. (2007) also 
decided that privately owned banks are more profitable than government owned and mutual banks. 
They found that one of those mutual, private and public banks, publicly owned banks has the highest 
NPLs and bad loan quality whereas mutual banks government owned has lowest NPLs and high 
quality loans. Furthermore, Micco et al. (2007) have found that privately owned banks has the better 
performance than all other government owned banks in developing countries. They also find that the 
government owned banks have higher costs and lower profitability as compared to the private banks, 
whereas opposite is the case for foreign owned banks. 
 
De Nicolo (2001) and Iannota et al.  (2007) have suggested that government-owned banks 
typically represent higher risk than other types of banks. Micco et al. (2004) have analyzed the 
financial institutions with different ownership types covering 119 countries. He decides that non 
performing loans are tend to be higher for banks with government ownership than for other groups. Hu 
et al. (2004) used a panel of Taiwanese banks and find a positive correlation between capital share 
owned by the goverment and the level of non-performing loans. However, Garcia-Marco and Robles-
Fernandez (2007) investigated the relationship between risk taking and ownership structure document 
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that commercial banks (mainly private owned) are more exposed to risk than deposit banks (mainly 
government owned).  
 
Ahmad (2013) investigate of commercial banks currently operating in Pakistan. Currently 
there are 30 commercial banks operating in Pakistan which can be divided into three broad categories 
i.e., public sector, private sector and foreign banks. The studies have  found the positive association 
between NPLs and publically owned or dispersed ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Berger et al., 
2005; Iannota et al., 2007; and Nichols et al., 2009). 
 
Tehulu and Olana (2014) investigate the bank specific determinants of credit risk of Ethiopian 
commercial banks. For this reason causal research design was applied in this study since the objective 
is to assess cause effect relationship. The sample consists of a panel of ten (10) commercial banks that 
were registered before 2007 from around 19 banks operating in the country. The period 2007-2011 
was chosen just to examine the determinants of credit risk using recent data and recently established 
banks were not considered to avoid new entrant bias.  The studies have found the ownership has a 
impact on credit risk. This finding shows that government banks were more risky than private banks. 
 
Boudriga et al. (2009) investigate The  aggregate banking, financial, economic, and legal 
environment data for a panel of 59 countries over the period 2002-2006. It develops a comprehensive 
model to explain differences in the level of NPLs between countries. To assess the role of regulatory 
supervision on credit risk, the paper uses several interactions between institutional features and 
regulatory devices. The studies have  found The government property are positive and significant, 
which indicates that state-ownership rises the level of problem loans. This could be explained either by 
the development mandate given to state-owned banks, especially in developing countries, or by their 
weaker credit recovery capacities. These combined effects lead to higher credit risk taking and to 
increased defaults. This result corroborates those of Micco et al. (2004) who conclude that NPLs tend 





This research employs the data from financial statements which consist of 124 commercial 
banks operated in the Indonesia banking industry. The time period of the study was from 2008 to 
2013, the data are taken from banks’ annual reports of fiscal year ends on December 31 of each year 
and the data set consists of 45 private banks, 4 government banks, and 22 community development 
banks, a total is 71 banks. This studies is using panel data and pooled ordinary least square (OLS). The 
following model is estimated: 
NPLsit = β0 + β1 DPRIVtit + β2 CDBit + β3*CARit + β4*LDRit + β5*ROAit + β6*INFit  + β7*GROWTHit  
+eit  
Where i refers to the bank, t refers to the years 
NPLsit : Non Performing Loans 
DPRIVit : Dummy variable taking the value 1 for government bank and 0 
for otherwise bank. 
DCDBit : Dummy variable taking the value 1 for community development 
bank and 0 for otherwise bank. 
CARit: : Dummy variable taking the value 1 for foreign exchange bank 
and 0 for otherwise bank. 
LDRit : Dummy variabel taking the value 1 for total equity less than IDR 
100 billion while 0 for otherwise total equity. 
ROAit: : Return on assets of bank i in period t, 
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INF t: : Annual Inflation of Indonesia varibale.  
GROWTHt: : Annual Economic growth of Indonesia varibale.  
 
D.  FINDINGS 
Table 1. Comparisons of mean of selected variables between different systems of banks 
Ratios Means all bank 
(%) 
Means (%) p-Value (2 tailed) 
NPLs 0.7501  a, d, i 
Private banks  0.0199  
CDB  2.0908  
Government banks  1.5900  
    
CAR 6.9706  a, d, g 
Private banks  0.3674  
CDB  18.8155  
Government banks  16.1095  
    
ROA 1.2505   
Private banks  0.0128 a, d, ns3 
CDB  3.4355  
Government banks  3.1585  
    
LDR 31.3975  a, d, ns3 
Private banks  0.9116  
CDB  84.4683  
Government banks  82.4735  
a, b,c, or ns1 shows that the mean difference of a variable between private and community 
development banks is significant at either 1%, 5%, 10%, or not significant at all. 
d,e,f, or ns2 shows that the mean difference of a variable between private and government banks is 
significant at either 1%, 5%, 10%, or not significant at all. 
g,h,i, or ns3 shows that the mean difference of a variable between community development and 
government banks is significant at either 1%, 5%, 10%, or not significant at all. 
 
Table 3 shows the average ratio of NPLs for all banks under study amounted to 0.7501%. This 
shows a low enough number that banks avoid from borrowing problems. For each bank ownership, the 
largest NPLs in the CDB is 2.0908%, but this figure is still below Bank Indonesia's 4%. The lowest 
NPLs at private banks is 0.0199%, which indicates that private banks are very careful in lending so 
that the amount of bad loans is very low. The NPLs of the three bank holdings have significant 
differences, indicating that each of these holdings has different levels of NPLs so that they have 
different lending risks. 
The CAR ratio indicates that private banks are higher than CDB and government banks, of the 
three holdings having significant differences. This shows the CAR ratios of the three bank holdings 
have different values, but the CAR ratio is still above the minimum Bank Indonesia requirement of 
8%. Average ROA ratio of 1.25% where the highest value in the CDB of 3.43% and the lowest private 
banks 0.0128%. This shows the benefits of government-owned banks whether CDB or government 
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banks have no difference and have better performance than private banks. This may be due to 
government assistance to banks facing financial difficulties. The highest LDR ratio of the private 
banks with the average of all banks is 88.39%. This shows private banks are very aggressive in 
lending from government-owned banks. 
   
Table 2. Regression without Adjusting and with Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable: NPL 
Variable OLS without standard errors OLS with robust standard 
errors                  
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Constan 
7.605   0.000***      7.605   0.003***      
DPRIV -1.403    0.080*     -1.403    0.035**     
DCDB 0.799    0.326     0.799    0.050**      
CAR -0.001    0.760     -0.001    0.501     
LDR -0.009    0.014 **    -0.009    0.014**     
ROA -1.006    0.000***     -1.006    0.001***     
INF -0.146    0.237     -0.146     0.084**     
GROWTH -0.218    0.432     -0.218    0.592     
     
R-squared 0.2406  0.2406  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2252    
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0022  
Number observation 355  355  
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
The result of regression method above, shows variable of PRIV, CDB, LDR, ROA and INF 
have significant effect on NPLs. These results indicate that the three variables play a significant role in 
determining the level of NPLs in banks in Indonesia by 50.52%. 
CDB has a positive relation on NPLs, it indicates that CDB has higher non-performing loan 
compared to private banks and government banks.  This result is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Micco et al. (2004), Hu et al. (2004), Berger et al. (2005), Iannota et al. (2007), Nichols et al. 
(2009),   Boudriga et al. (2009), Ahmad (2013), Adjei-Mensah (2014) and Tehulu and Olana (2014).  
The positive relation confirms that the control of the owners on the mangers is weak, resulting in the 
asymmetry of information and conflict of interest between owners and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), heading to the decisions that are in benefit to managers. Due to less supervision and 
control, managers increase the riskiness of the loan portfolio in order to improve the short term cost 
efficiency. They lend money to the low quality borrowers, resulting in the growth of future NPLs. In 
CDB, owned banks level of supervision and monitoring is very weak, because large number of stake 
of dispersed investor are connected. As the stake of individual investor is small therefore they pay less 
attention on the working and risk exposure of the banks. 
 
Corruption also have played important role in the growth of NPLs in the CDB owned banks. 
In country such of Indonesia, regulatory and supervisory authorities are very weak in controlling and 
implementing laws, due to which lenders take full advantage and do not repay loans because they 
know that no strong legal action will be taken against them because of this rate of NPLs CDB are on 
the higher side. The other reason for the increase in NPLs is the corruption in the political system of 
the country. Most of the political owned firms lend funds from the banks and by using the political 
power and corrupt practices happened by do not repay loan (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Furthermore, it 
resulting the management of the banks also by using corrupt practices by lends money to low quality 




The other main reason for the positive relation between NPLs and CDB owned banks is the 
lenient credit policies and inefficiency of the credit evolution departments of the banks; because CDB 
lend money to those who are ready to pay more than others and do not take collaterals rather lend 
funds on the warranties and political status. Due to all these reason CDB owned banks has high rate of 
NPLs than other banks (Micco et al., 2007). The positive relation also confirms the findings of 
Saunders et al., (1990) that in publically owned banks managers can take higher risks due to the weak 
supervision and monitoring. This results in the increase in loan portfolio riskiness and thus results in 
the growth of future NPLs. 
 
The CDB are positive and significant. It appears that CDB raises the level of problem loans. 
This could be explained either by the establishment mandate given to CDB, especially in Indonesia, or 
by their weaker credit recovery competences. These combined effects lead to higher credit risk taking 
and to increased defaults. This result confirmed that Micco et al. (2004) who conclude that NPLs tend 
to be higher for government banks on a panel of developing countries. 
 
The results of current study reject the traditional view of Berle and Means (1933) that 
concentrated ownership (private ownership) has positive impact on the efficiency and performance of 
the banks and with concentrated ownership control and supervision on the firm increases, resulting in 
the achievement of owner’s goal. The justification for the positive relation can be that in private 
owned banks control of the owners on the management is strong, thus owners can influence the risk 
taking decision of the management and can force the management to increase the riskiness of the loan 
portfolio by lending funds to the low quality borrowers (Saunders et al., 1990; Laeven and Levine, 
2009), resulting in the future growth of NPLs. The results of current study confirm the traditional view 
of Berle and Means (1933) in case of foreign ownership that concentrated ownership has positive 
impact on the efficiency and performance of the banks. They further suggested that with concentrated 
ownership control and supervision on the firm increases resulting in the decline of firm riskiness 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
 
ROA has a negative effect on NPLs, this indicates that the low bank profit caused by high 
level of bad debts so bad credit very influence to bank profit level. Bad credit will increase the cost of 
the bank so that the level of bank profit will affect. The LDR variable has a positive effect on the 
NPLs. This indicates that the loan provided by the bank has the potential to stall so that the larger the 
loan is given the greater the bad credit experienced by the bank. This may be due to the level of 
customer's honesty that is still lacking to pay for the loan other than that, the state of the business 
customers who suffered losses so they cannot afford to pay the loan. 
Inflation has a negative effect on NPLs. This indicates that may be due to the decrease in 
volume of loans granted by banks and the banks becoming more selective of high quality borrowers 
during high inflation period. The finding is similar to that of Al-Smadi and Ahmad (2009). The results 
of several studies done by Jimenez and Saurina (2006); Quagliariello (2007) and Fofack (2005) 
support the idea that high interest rate increase obligation of borrowers and thus increase credit risk. 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The result of research indicates that there are difference of variable of NPLs, CAR, LDR and ROA 
for private banks, CDB and government banks. A very interesting thing in this study is that the 
ownership dummy of CDB has a positive effect on the NPL, it shows that CDB has a higher non-
performing loan level compared to private banks and government bank. This condition are the control 
of the owners on the mangers is weak, the other main reason for the positive relation between 
NPLs and CDB owned banks is the lenient credit policies and inefficiency of the credit 
evolution departments of the banks, Corruption also play important role in the growth of 
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